The Genius of Hannibal

I thought I'd take some time out today to simply marvel at one of history's most famous tacticians. Hannibal's genius cannot be understated, in my opinion: he was a man far ahead of his time and culture, and had his family been positioned a little more favorably within Carthaginian politics, it seems likely that history would remember the Second Punic War as the event that ended Roman expansion and brought the rogue Italian superpower to heel, paving the way for Phoenician hegemony throughout the Mediterranean.

The Barca family had a reputation as fierce fighters and noble warriors. However, Carthaginian culture was largely based on trading and the mighty city trained only a small percentage of its residents as professional soldiers, hiring most of the work of battle out to mercenary groups. Hence, though Hannibal's father Hamilcar fought the last eight years of the First Punic War with virtually no support from Carthage itself, his sacrifice and continual victories counted for little in the eyes of Carthaginian politicians, who allowed him an expedition in Spain after the war mostly to get rid of him. Young Hannibal joined his father in this conquest, and spent most of his adolescent years encamped with the soldiers, who took a liking to the young warrior and trained him in every weapon they could. Thus, when Hannibal one day took up his father's reigns and led the army, he commanded strong personal loyalty from them and there is no report of mutiny among his troops to be found in recorded history.

I like to believe that Hannibal's military education was two-fold: he likely learned about the more efficient “guerilla” tactics from his father, and the more practical, battlefield realities from the encamped soldiers. Thus, we have events like the Battle of Trebia, in which Hannibal hid some allied forces to execute an ambush against the already engaged Roman infantry, whom he had also deprived of their morning breakfast and forced to walk through the freezing Trebia river. That battle alone combines many elements from Hannibal's likely upbringing: the ambush tactics his father perfected, plus knowing that an unfed army poses little threat to a well-supplied force.

The biggest innovation in Roman tactics of that time was the maniple system, which allowed different lines of infantry to assault the enemy's front lines while having an avenue to fall back should the battle prove difficult. While they did deploy cavalry on their wings, their only purpose was to engage the enemy cavalry. This helped to win many battles, but was still essentially focused on the enemy's front. Hannibal knew that his forces would eventually be facing larger numbers, and so he focused on mobility, harassment, and flanking.

His wisdom in fighting battles also extended to knowing when he could not win. While Fabius was struggling to contain him in southern Italy, Hannibal tricked one of the containment armies by attaching torches to a herd of oxen and driving them through the forest at night. Thinking it was the enemy army preparing an ambush, the legions followed the torches, determined to out-ambush this troublesome Carthaginian. While they were busy chasing oxen, Hannibal led his forces through the now undefended pass and made for resupply in the north.

The saying goes that amateurs study tactics, while professionals study logistics. Unfortunately for Hannibal, he never fully secured supply lines from Carthage, and had to repeatedly fight for resupply from the Gauls or whichever Italian city decided to join him that week. Though he spent an impressive ten years in Italy campaigning successfully against the Romans, it was only a matter of time until the Romans took the war to Carthage, giving command to the unorthodox general Scipio Africanus, who would use Hannibal's own tactics to gain a victory over Carthage and Hannibal at the Battle of Zama.

Pax vobiscum

Military Monday: The Early Maniples

The Phalanx had served Rome well. The Etruscans used it to dominate the early Romans in the 700's BCE, and the Romans were nothing if not very efficient copy-cats. So they worked toward overcoming Etruscan hegemony and in 509 BCE (or sometime thereabout), they succeeded in overthrowing their king and reforming their constitution to include separation of powers, election of Senators, and citizens' assemblies. Their Hoplite armies proceeded to subdue the cities in northern Italy, and established Roman hegemony in their region. However, the Phalanx proved problematic in several embarrassing battles.

The Roman Phalanx was arrayed with the wealthiest citizens in the front, center rank, which made sense because they had the best quality armor and weapons. A strong core meant a strong army, or so the wisdom of the time dictated. However, an army with weak flanks is just asking for trouble, which the Romans learned at a great cost at The Battle of the Allia around 390 BCE, where the Senone Gauls crushed their flanks and surrounded their core, killing them to the man. Later, in the Second Samnite War (326-304 BCE), the Romans learned from their enemies the value of small, flexible groups in a battle. And by learned from, I mean that they got beaten like little girls several times by these 'barbarians,' before numbers and brute force established their dominance over the hill country of central Italy.

So, whether through sweeping reforms as the later historians claimed, or through the more likely course of gradual tactical evolution, the Romans decided to do away with the single-line Phalanx and make way for a more effective army. This army would consist of three different types of heavy foot soldiers who were arrayed in three lines on the field in a checkerboard formation. Of particular concern, especially to the Roman upper-class, was the economic order of soldiers. Putting the most well-armed and protected soldiers in the front line made sense if you wanted the initial shock to truly penetrate the enemy line, but it meant that those soldiers may be unable to help if the battle was long and contentious. So the change in battle-lines began with placing the poorest of the soldiers (who were still members of that upper rung, just 'lower-upper' classmen) at the front of the army. These front-line soldiers were called Hastati, named for the spears they carried, the Hasta. Early on, all of the soldiers carried these spears, but the Hastati were likely named for it because they were at least wealthy enough to afford their own spear.

All of this would vary because all the equipment was self-provided, but a typical Hastati would be outfitted in leather armor and a bronze helmet, but no leg armor. Along with their Hasta, they would carry a scutum, one of those famous convex rectangular shields. After the Hastati was the Principe, who carried the same weapons, but had leg armor and chain-mail covering their torso, which was highly prized in the ancient world for giving protection without hindering mobility. The third line was composed of Triarii, who had the heaviest armor and highest quality weapons, and fought in a tight phalanx. The flanking units, who were above the Triarii, were the Equites, early cavalrymen rich enough to afford the best armor and weapons, and a horse. Incidentally, this is the reason that horse-related activities are referred to as “equestrian.”

Attached to each of the line soldiers was a compliment of Leves, or javelin-throwers who used light javelins to harass the enemy line before a charge. This proved especially effective against a Phalanx because it is hard to maintain a strong frontal formation while dodging javelins. Gaps could be exploited, and the enemy line could be divided and crushed. Discipline was essential for this kind of fighting, and lieutenants had to pay close attention to the banners and whistles coming from the main army to make sure their unit wasn't surrounded if there was a call to retreat. Training the individual soldiers took a few months out of the year, and it was considered the duty of the wealthy in Rome to protect the city and advance the Roman agenda throughout the world.

A typical Roman battle using the Camillian Maniples would go like this: Hastati charge, while Leves soften the line. If the Hastati couldn't break the enemy battle line, they would retreat in an organized fashion behind the Triarii in the back while the Principes charged forward, making their own attempt to crush the enemy. However, if they could not succeed, then they, too would retreat and the Triarii would charge.

Usually the Triarii could luxuriate behind the battle line and watch the show, but if a battle was going poorly enough for them to get involved, it was not a good sign. A Latin idiom meaning 'to be in a desperate situation' is ' rem ad Triarios redisse,' which literally means, 'it has come to the Triarii.' For example, "How close are you to getting out of debt?” “It has come to the Triarii.” Try it next time someone asks you about a hopeless situation, and the look on their face should lift your spirits nicely!

As well as this primitive strategy worked, it couldn't last forever. And as you may have guessed, it was  humiliating defeat that forced the Romans once again to renew their tactical and strategic methods and ensure their dominance of the Mediterranean. Hannibal, in particular, played a part in bringing the spearmen-based Maniples to an end, especially after a huge Roman army was crushed at the Battle of Cannae.

However, despite the resounding defeats they suffered, what kept Roman culture and influence alive for more than a thousand years was their ability to adapt. It's true that their pride was gravely wounded by massive defeats (especially from the 'barbarians'), but eventually they got over themselves, went back to the drawing board, and found something that worked. And the coming reform of the Legions meant that the class preference in the Roman army would be destroyed for a merit-based seniority system.

Pax vobiscum