The Centurion's Riddle

Quick: how many soldiers did a centurion command?  If you guessed one hundred, you are dead wrong.  Don't feel bad, though, a lot of people have gotten this wrong for hundreds of years.  A centurion, in the days of the early Republic, commanded about 60 men, or half of a maniple.  Later centurions of the early Imperial Era commanded around 80.  So why the confusion?

Basically, it comes down to a problem of language.  Centum is Latin for one hundred, and it's where we get the terms centimeter, centigrade, century, and cent.  There is a similar word which the Romans used to describe their army divisions: Centuriae.  This word means tribe or group, and literally has almost zero relation to the word centum.  Avid readers will remember this post [link], where we learned about the Comitia Centuriata, which is translated "Tribal Assembly."

Lazy scholarship led to people assuming that centum and centuriae were related when it's clear that their similarity is purely coincidental.  Imagine a future in which the people believe that the ancient English word Career meant being able to drive a Car.

Pax vobiscum

-- On a side note, I will now be posting a little differently - All the days will continue their present themes, but they will be on an every other day/week basis.  So, Technology Tuesday and Theology Thursday will have to wait until next week, while Culture Wednesday and Famous Friday are still on track for this one.  Having babies changes everything

Catching up: The Battle of Mylae and the Corvus

At the beginning of the First Punic War, Rome and Carthage both faced significant disadvantages to one another, and a kind of Cold War stalemate ensued for the first four years of the war. By 264 BCE, the Roman army had been honed into a victory machine in most land battles, particularly where rough, hilly terrain was the proving ground. This gave them many tactical victories in Sicily early on, the primary theater of the war, but the Carthaginians had been holding that land for many years, and developed a solid defensive strategy that left them well-fortified even if the local garrison had been routed. Carthaginian ships would arrive with fresh mercenary troops and supplies, making it difficult for the Romans to really gain any ground, since they didn't have a navy of their own to counter the enemy.

The story goes that some Carthaginian ships washed up on the Italian shore and were discovered by the Romans, who copied the design and made themselves ready for a sea invasion of North Africa or Iberia. However, siege weapons aboard boats were pretty useless in those days, so crews had to rely on ramming to tear their enemy's hulls and sink them in the Mediterranean, an art in which the Carthaginians were well-versed. Time and again, they sunk every Roman ship that dared cross into their space, breaking blockades with ease and resupplying their dwindling, demoralized armies in Sicily. So how does a land-based power defeat a naval power? By turning sea battles into land battles.

Roman engineers developed the Corvus, a swiveling draw-bridge device whose spiked tip could be smashed onto an enemy deck, attaching the two ships and allowing for legionnaires to take the ship. The Carthaginian fleet didn't know what hit them at Mylae: they lost almost half of their fleet to the Romans, who appropriated the vessels and bolstered their navy. Carthage's biggest advantage was lost, and the surprise of the Roman tactics cost them heavily. The war would drag on for nineteen more years, however, and end with Carthage being driven out of Sicily for good, causing them to intensify their colonization efforts in Spain and once again come into conflict with Rome.

While the Corvus remains one of the most brilliant innovations in ancient naval warfare, Carthage adjusted its sea tactics after several other disastrous encounters with Roman fleets. Roman innovation won the day, and the tired old Phoenician stronghold teetered one step closer to eventual annihilation.

Pax vobiscum

The Genius of Hannibal

I thought I'd take some time out today to simply marvel at one of history's most famous tacticians. Hannibal's genius cannot be understated, in my opinion: he was a man far ahead of his time and culture, and had his family been positioned a little more favorably within Carthaginian politics, it seems likely that history would remember the Second Punic War as the event that ended Roman expansion and brought the rogue Italian superpower to heel, paving the way for Phoenician hegemony throughout the Mediterranean.

The Barca family had a reputation as fierce fighters and noble warriors. However, Carthaginian culture was largely based on trading and the mighty city trained only a small percentage of its residents as professional soldiers, hiring most of the work of battle out to mercenary groups. Hence, though Hannibal's father Hamilcar fought the last eight years of the First Punic War with virtually no support from Carthage itself, his sacrifice and continual victories counted for little in the eyes of Carthaginian politicians, who allowed him an expedition in Spain after the war mostly to get rid of him. Young Hannibal joined his father in this conquest, and spent most of his adolescent years encamped with the soldiers, who took a liking to the young warrior and trained him in every weapon they could. Thus, when Hannibal one day took up his father's reigns and led the army, he commanded strong personal loyalty from them and there is no report of mutiny among his troops to be found in recorded history.

I like to believe that Hannibal's military education was two-fold: he likely learned about the more efficient “guerilla” tactics from his father, and the more practical, battlefield realities from the encamped soldiers. Thus, we have events like the Battle of Trebia, in which Hannibal hid some allied forces to execute an ambush against the already engaged Roman infantry, whom he had also deprived of their morning breakfast and forced to walk through the freezing Trebia river. That battle alone combines many elements from Hannibal's likely upbringing: the ambush tactics his father perfected, plus knowing that an unfed army poses little threat to a well-supplied force.

The biggest innovation in Roman tactics of that time was the maniple system, which allowed different lines of infantry to assault the enemy's front lines while having an avenue to fall back should the battle prove difficult. While they did deploy cavalry on their wings, their only purpose was to engage the enemy cavalry. This helped to win many battles, but was still essentially focused on the enemy's front. Hannibal knew that his forces would eventually be facing larger numbers, and so he focused on mobility, harassment, and flanking.

His wisdom in fighting battles also extended to knowing when he could not win. While Fabius was struggling to contain him in southern Italy, Hannibal tricked one of the containment armies by attaching torches to a herd of oxen and driving them through the forest at night. Thinking it was the enemy army preparing an ambush, the legions followed the torches, determined to out-ambush this troublesome Carthaginian. While they were busy chasing oxen, Hannibal led his forces through the now undefended pass and made for resupply in the north.

The saying goes that amateurs study tactics, while professionals study logistics. Unfortunately for Hannibal, he never fully secured supply lines from Carthage, and had to repeatedly fight for resupply from the Gauls or whichever Italian city decided to join him that week. Though he spent an impressive ten years in Italy campaigning successfully against the Romans, it was only a matter of time until the Romans took the war to Carthage, giving command to the unorthodox general Scipio Africanus, who would use Hannibal's own tactics to gain a victory over Carthage and Hannibal at the Battle of Zama.

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The Battle of Alesia

In 52 BCE, the Gauls had united in a last-ditch effort against the invaders. Any one tribe who stood up to the Romans in recent memory had been utterly defeated, but now there was a new hope. The tribes had convened a council and selected one man to lead the rebel army to victory and restore freedom to their war-torn homeland. And that man's name was Vercingetorix.

Using hit-and-run cavalry tactics while taking refuge in well-defended forts gave this rebel leader a few victories over the Roman army, led by the famous and able Gaius Julius Caesar. In one such engagement, Caesar's 12 legions had attempted to storm his position at Gergovia, Vercingetorix drove them back, killing 700 legionnaires in the process and nearly causing a mass route of the entire army. Caesar was clever, though, and chose from then on to hunt down small detachments of the larger Gallic army, whittling their forces down to a more manageable size. Vercingetorix went with his typical play of strategically withdrawing his troops to a fortified position: the town of Alesia, atop a small hill.

I can only imagine the thoughts that must have consumed this last, best hope for Gaulkind watching helplessly from the city walls as the Romans built their own walls to solidify their defense. He had to witness the slow deaths of the women and children of the city, who starved to death after being expelled from the city and were then forbidden to pass through the Roman camp. He dispatched scout cavalry in an attempt to slow the construction, hoping to last until the relieving Gallic army arrived. The situation was desperate, and his men growing close to insubordinate treachery when a Gallic army of 100,000 arrived to relieve the siege. Hope was in the air that at long last, the Romans would be driven back and they would be free once again.

The Romans were now facing a battle on two fronts, but they had the luxury of their two walls, which kept them very well protected from the combined forces of 180,000. Their own 60,000 legionnaires were disciplined and well-armed; their foreign auxiliaries ready to do their part. After a few skirmishes and one night attack, the Gauls took a few sections of the Roman trench. They prepared for an all-out assault on the weakest point of the fortifications – a section where the two walls met with boulders and other natural hindrances to construction, a place Caesar had attempted to conceal.

The relieving force assaulted first, charging straight into the infantry lines and meeting the Romans steel to steel. Caesar ordered his men to hold the line while riding behind their ranks and cheering them on. He then led a counter-attack which drove off Vercingetorix's besieged men, who had sallied out of Alesia to support their Gallic compatriots. His line, weakened by the men that Caesar took to defend their rear, began to fall back and Gaius had to roll the dice. In a move both brilliant and incredibly risky, he took 6,000 cavalry with him and circled around the massive Gallic horde of 60,000, flanking them and cutting deep into their assault line. The Roman infantry, seeing their commanders risking their necks, were inspired by their bravery and pushed forward, pinching the Gallic line and causing the undisciplined tribal army to rout. Roman cavalry took over from there, hunting the fleeing soldiers down without mercy and laying waste to any hope that Vercingetorix maintained of being freed from this terrible siege.

A few days later, the mighty Gallic warlord surrendered, giving up his sword and armor to Caesar, who gladly accepted. With this defeat, Gaius Julius Caesar would forever solidify Roman domination over the Gauls.

Pax vobiscum

The Disaster at Cannae

Just as our own Second World War overshadows the First, the Second Punic War made the First look like a ping-pong match. Hannibal Barca, the fearsome Carthaginian leader, had marched through the Alps, allied with several Gallic tribes, and made it his mission in life to humiliate every Roman army that tried to stop him. Thus, Quintus Fabius Maximus was given the title of prodictator, which means acting dictator, and given but one task: stop Hannibal. In hindsight, Fabius appears to be one of the wisest military men in Rome because after closely studying the Roman defeats at Trebia and Trasimene, he knew better than to allow Hannibal to decide the conditions of battle.

Instead of assaulting this army of 56,000 with his much larger force, he shadowed Hannibal during his march through southern Italy, staying up on high defensible ridges and mountains rather than meeting them openly. With enough patience, his strategy probably would have succeeded in either forcing Hannibal to fight on Roman terms, or flee home before his forces dwindled or mutinied. Hannibal tried everything to force a Roman confrontation, pillaging and raiding the countryside and devastating the landscape the Romans had fought so hard in securing a few generations before. However, Fabius was not like the previous hot-blooded Romans that Hannibal had so easily goaded into a fight they couldn't win. His patience meant that the Carthaginian forces had to spend the winter in southern Italy, cut off from their supply and forced to forage in the snow.

The rest of Rome was not sold on Fabius' pragmatism, however, and as soon as his term as prodictator was up, he was denied reelection and two Consuls served in the executive, both of whom favored an aggressive strategy against Hannibal. They were authorized to raise eight instead of the traditional four legions, which comes to 40,000 heavy infantry. In addition, their subservient Latin allies were levied for an additional 40,000 foot soldiers, along with 6,000 Roman and Allied cavalry, so that they outnumbered the Carthaginian troops almost 2 to 1.

Hannibal seized a valuable supply depot in Cannae and the huge Roman army came to face him in open battle. There was some contention among the two Consuls who led the army, with Varro favoring a pitched battle anywhere, anytime, and Paullus favoring a more prudent course of waiting for a better opportunity. On his day of command, Varro ordered his troops into action, changing their formation somewhat to accommodate his sense of tactics. Since they were fighting on an open plain, he had the maniples, who were normally spread out to allow for greater movement and flexibility, pushed together and had the Principes come up close behind the Hastati in an almost-phalanx way.

Hannibal advanced his line to meet the enemy, forming his troops into a “v” formation, pointing their axis toward the Roman line. Varro, believing that this would allow his troops to punch through the line and surround the enemy, advanced his own troops hurriedly, hoping to catch Hannibal off guard. However, as the bold Romans charged, the Carthaginian troops at the very front fell back to the solid line behind them, causing the Romans to charge faster and lose their cohesion, thinking that the enemy was already running away. This gave an opportunity for Hannibal's cavalry to do its work. They charged the opposing Roman cavalry, who were fewer in number and not near as well-equipped, and caused them to rout without much difficulty. Here's a handy diagram to illustrate:

Then they turned their attention to the battle-frenzied infantry line, flanking the Triarii in the rear as they charged forward. Before the Romans had time to react, they were surrounded on all sides, in the center of a deadly crush of arms from both footmen and cavalry. The army was utterly destroyed, according to Polybius around 70,000 died and 10,000 captured with only a few thousand escaping, while Hannibal's forces only suffered around 8-9,000 casualties.

The Senate felt the need to deal with Hannibal quickly because they feared that the other Latin cities would join with Hannibal if he were allowed to roam unchecked for too long. Ironically, it was his victory at Cannae that motivated many former allies of Rome to switch sides and declare for Carthage, including Macedonia, Syracuse, and several Latin cities. After this decisive victory, the Romans saw the need for prudence and pursued a Fabian policy of containment, which was Hannibal's ultimate undoing as he continually tried to replenish his forces for a siege that would never succeed. In the end, it was only by using Hannibal's own tactics against him that the Romans would ever see victory in the Second Punic War.

Pax vobiscum

The Siege of Syracuse

Located in south-eastern Sicily, Syracuse was an old Corinthian-Greek Colony with old-time values. Ruled over by kings and tyrants since its founding in 733 BCE, Syracuse enjoyed the many benefits of its central Mediterranean locale and became very wealthy through trade with Egypt, Rome, Carthage, Asia Minor, Palestine, and Spain. After the Pyrrhic war in 275 BCE, however, it was the sole remaining Greek settlement west of the Peninsula itself, and in a very tenuous position sandwiched between Rome and Carthage.

Syracuse survived for quite a while after Pyrrhus' final defeat because its leaders made smart alliances and used skilled diplomacy to ensure the protection of either Rome or Carthage. When the first Punic War broke out, Syracuse was at the center of the action and made an alliance with Carthage from fear of Rome. Luckily, Rome and Carthage fought each other so bitterly that by the time Rome got around to dealing with the unlucky Sicilian Greeks, they had already lost so many in battle that they were willing to settle for an apology and a cut of their trade. However, when the second Punic War broke out, Syracuse made the mistake of allying with Carthage again, and the Romans were determined to make them pay. However, Roman vengeance would come at a high cost to the Republic because of one resident of Syracuse whose mind possessed knowledge that could bring both great prosperity and very great destruction. This man's name was Archimedes.

I like to think of Archimedes as a sort of ancient world Da Vinci, except without the moral qualms about creating weapons. Where Da Vinci was purposefully putting gears in the wrong place so that his designs would ultimately fail, Archimedes was not only sketching these out, but utilizing them to a terrible degree of success. For this week's Famous Friday, we'll delve into Archimedes' discoveries in greater detail, but since it's Military Monday, let's focus on his original and horrific siege weapons.

The most famous of his weapons was The Claw, which utilized pulleys and complicated weight balancing to capsize Roman Triremes. Seriously, this crane-like weapon would hook onto the bow or stern of the boat, lift it out of the water, and send it crashing against the nearby rocks. Each boat carried about two hundred soldiers, so you can imagine the carnage that ensued when this happened over and over:

Another of his creations was an improved catapult. Again, using pulleys and counterweights, he was able to create an engine capable of throwing a 500 pound rock with much better accuracy than the inferior Roman scorpions and ballistae. He also contributed to the building of other weapons which could fire missiles and keep the Romans at bay.

The most controversial of his creations was his 'death ray.' Several authorities have tested it using various techniques, and some have been successful, while most have ended in a wash. Supposedly, Archimedes built a large array of bronze mirrors which could be turned, focusing their reflected light into a concentrated beam onto an approaching ship. The Roman ships, which were sealed with tar, caught on fire and sunk. While this does seem a bit far-fetched, I wouldn't put it past old Archie to give it a try. After all, it was Hiero II, the king of Syracuse and relative of Archimedes, who frequently challenged the genius and gave him the funding he needed to build better weapons since the first Punic War, so why wouldn't this mathematician try literally everything he could think of? Were there easier ways to light ships on fire? Yeah, lots. But if I were an invading Roman, I might think twice about mixing it up with an enemy who can light my ships on fire without shooting anything.

Syracuse eventually fell to sheer Roman determination, and Archimedes was killed, possibly while drawing circles in the sand. If not for him, the last Greek colony on Italian soil would surely have fallen in the first year, and Carthage wouldn't have stood a chance of surviving the Second Punic War. By the time the Roman army came to the gates of Carthage, they had suffered so many casualties from Syracuse and from fighting Hannibal for ten years that they allowed Carthage to live, albeit under severe economic sanctions. And when Carthage was finally leveled in the Third Punic War, there were no more brilliant mathematicians around to set Romans on fire from a distance.

Pax vobiscum