Scipio Africanus: A New Kind of Roman

Known to readers of this blog as 'that guy who finally beat Hannibal,' Scipio Africanus was much more than just another Roman military genius. He grew his hair long, wore his toga in an unorthodox style, preferred Greek culture and language to Latin, and became a model of later charismatic commanders like Gaius Marius, Lucius Cornelius Sulla, and Julius Caesar. Scipio introduced the cult of personality into Roman politics, and it was a cult that would outlive and ultimately destroy the Republic itself.

Scipio got his start at age 17, joining his father on campaign against the Carthaginian invaders. He was present at the battles of Ticinus, Trebia, and Cannae, all of which ended with decisive victories for Hannibal. In 211 BCE a mere five years after that crushing defeat at Cannae, Scipio went to the Senate and requested command over the new Roman army which was being sent to Spain (the previous army had been utterly destroyed by Hannibal's brother Hasdrubal). The other candidates kept their mouths shut, believing Spain to be a death sentence, now that it was once again so firmly under Carthaginian control. Scipio promptly captured New Carthage and proceeded to win goodwill for Roman occupation. He set captives free, and returned a young Celtiberian princess to her fiancé and family, thus earning that tribe's allegiance against the Carthaginians.

Wisely plotting his strategic course, he sought to defeat the three Carthaginian armies in the area one by one, knowing that they would too far outnumber his own legions if he faced them all at once. He faced off against Hasdrubal Barca in the battle of Baecula and gained a victory by using a similar technique that gave Hannibal the victory at Cannae. Hasdrubal withdrew and marched on Italy, and in a controversial move both now and then, Scipio Africanus refused to pursue. There have been many theories of why he did this, but I tend to believe that it was his strategic good sense that prevented him from risking being caught between the remnants of Hasdrubal's forces and those of Mago or Gisgo, the other two Carthaginian commanders in Spain.

After gaining more Celtiberian allies, he defeated the two other Carthaginian commanders at Ilipa (modern Seville) in 206 BCE, and consequently drove their commanders out of Spain entirely. In addition to recruiting the local tribes, Scipio also made overtures to Syphax and Massinissa, two Numidian princes who agreed to cease their support of Carthage and supply the Roman army with cavalry. This was a huge win for the Romans because Numidian cavalry of the time outmatched nearly all other types, and was one of the chief causes of Hannibal's many successes. Syphax later switched back to the Carthaginian side, marrying one of their noble-ladies to seal the deal, but Massinissa proved extremely helpful in the later invasion of Carthage itself.

Scipio was the ultimate success story for the new culture of Rome: a culture which was fast-growing among the military and plebs. The old Roman model of farmer/soldier was quickly eroding under the increasing power of the Senate and their abusive practices toward the soldiers and the poor. The conservatives in the Senate distrusted his charismatic Greek mannerisms and disliked his fame. When Scipio won at Zama and ended the Second Punic War, he was greeted as a national hero in Rome and given his famous moniker Africanus. Several dissident groups offered to nominate him as Dictator or Consul for Life, but to his credit, he refused. It seems that this radical, innovative commander and politician had some old-fashioned Roman virtue in him after all.

Pax vobiscum

The Genius of Hannibal

I thought I'd take some time out today to simply marvel at one of history's most famous tacticians. Hannibal's genius cannot be understated, in my opinion: he was a man far ahead of his time and culture, and had his family been positioned a little more favorably within Carthaginian politics, it seems likely that history would remember the Second Punic War as the event that ended Roman expansion and brought the rogue Italian superpower to heel, paving the way for Phoenician hegemony throughout the Mediterranean.

The Barca family had a reputation as fierce fighters and noble warriors. However, Carthaginian culture was largely based on trading and the mighty city trained only a small percentage of its residents as professional soldiers, hiring most of the work of battle out to mercenary groups. Hence, though Hannibal's father Hamilcar fought the last eight years of the First Punic War with virtually no support from Carthage itself, his sacrifice and continual victories counted for little in the eyes of Carthaginian politicians, who allowed him an expedition in Spain after the war mostly to get rid of him. Young Hannibal joined his father in this conquest, and spent most of his adolescent years encamped with the soldiers, who took a liking to the young warrior and trained him in every weapon they could. Thus, when Hannibal one day took up his father's reigns and led the army, he commanded strong personal loyalty from them and there is no report of mutiny among his troops to be found in recorded history.

I like to believe that Hannibal's military education was two-fold: he likely learned about the more efficient “guerilla” tactics from his father, and the more practical, battlefield realities from the encamped soldiers. Thus, we have events like the Battle of Trebia, in which Hannibal hid some allied forces to execute an ambush against the already engaged Roman infantry, whom he had also deprived of their morning breakfast and forced to walk through the freezing Trebia river. That battle alone combines many elements from Hannibal's likely upbringing: the ambush tactics his father perfected, plus knowing that an unfed army poses little threat to a well-supplied force.

The biggest innovation in Roman tactics of that time was the maniple system, which allowed different lines of infantry to assault the enemy's front lines while having an avenue to fall back should the battle prove difficult. While they did deploy cavalry on their wings, their only purpose was to engage the enemy cavalry. This helped to win many battles, but was still essentially focused on the enemy's front. Hannibal knew that his forces would eventually be facing larger numbers, and so he focused on mobility, harassment, and flanking.

His wisdom in fighting battles also extended to knowing when he could not win. While Fabius was struggling to contain him in southern Italy, Hannibal tricked one of the containment armies by attaching torches to a herd of oxen and driving them through the forest at night. Thinking it was the enemy army preparing an ambush, the legions followed the torches, determined to out-ambush this troublesome Carthaginian. While they were busy chasing oxen, Hannibal led his forces through the now undefended pass and made for resupply in the north.

The saying goes that amateurs study tactics, while professionals study logistics. Unfortunately for Hannibal, he never fully secured supply lines from Carthage, and had to repeatedly fight for resupply from the Gauls or whichever Italian city decided to join him that week. Though he spent an impressive ten years in Italy campaigning successfully against the Romans, it was only a matter of time until the Romans took the war to Carthage, giving command to the unorthodox general Scipio Africanus, who would use Hannibal's own tactics to gain a victory over Carthage and Hannibal at the Battle of Zama.

Pax vobiscum

The Other Italians

Before the rise of Rome and its Empire, Italy was filled with a multitude of people groups, mostly tribal and nomadic, but united in themselves by common language and culture. One such people was the Samnites, whose culture was a combination of urban and tribal elements. They maintained their political independence until the Third Samnite War circa 290 BCE, when their land was taken by the Romans for good.

The Samnites worshiped the typical Greco-Roman Pantheon, especially Mars, Athena, and Hercules, and had the same tendency toward divination by birds and animal entrails. Their cities were surrounded by well-tended farms, while their shepherds would lead their flocks along a pre-determined grazing trail throughout the year.

Warfare was of utmost importance to these Latin tribesmen, and they had a reputation as ferocious fighters. Many believe that the Manipular system adopted by the Roman legions originally belonged to the Samnites, and they certainly understood the importance of army flexibility on the rough terrain of their homeland. They knew their lands well, and often used them to their advantage over the Romans and other peoples with whom they came into conflict.

Bravery served a dual purpose for these rugged shepherds as it directly affected their choice in marriage. Men who had performed great acts of bravery on the battlefield got first choice among the eligible women for a bride. Emotion in the ceremony itself was strictly forbidden, and men were expected to simply choose the woman they wanted with the approval of the tribal elders and priest.

Samnites fought with many weapons similar to Roman arms, including the javelin, spear, and rectangular shield (though theirs were tapered toward the bottom). However, they also excelled at using slings as well as the bow-and-arrow, crafts they no doubt perfected while protecting their herds from wild beasts or neighboring tribes. In one encounter with the Roman army, the Samnites had trapped several legions in a narrow pass called the Caudine Forks and positioned their archers high upon a nearby mountain to keep their enemy hemmed in.

The story goes that Gaius Pontius, the Samnite commander, was at an impasse when that Roman army surrendered to him. He dispatched a letter to his father, Herennius Pontius, a statesman and politician, to pick the old man's brain. Herennius responded in a letter that the Roman army should be freed, for which Rome would be grateful and possibly become an ally. Not liking this idea, Gaius sent another letter to his father, and this time the reply came back that the entire army should be executed, and Rome would then cease to be a threat for at least a generation. Gaius Pontius foolishly decided to try and have his cake and eat it, too, disarming the Romans and forcing them to pass under the “yoke”- a sort of doorway made of their own spears. The army returned unarmed and ashamed, but eager to have revenge and win back their lost honor. After honoring a five-year peace that they agreed to in their terms of surrender, they struck back hard at the Samnites and won the war, executing Gaius Pontius in the process.

Though they showed great promise as an up-and-coming civilization, the Samnites fell prey to their divided, tribal nature, and the Romans were able to play one family against another, successfully subduing their southern neighbors and incorporating them into Roman society as slaves, soldiers, and farmers.

Pax vobiscum

The Disaster at Cannae

Just as our own Second World War overshadows the First, the Second Punic War made the First look like a ping-pong match. Hannibal Barca, the fearsome Carthaginian leader, had marched through the Alps, allied with several Gallic tribes, and made it his mission in life to humiliate every Roman army that tried to stop him. Thus, Quintus Fabius Maximus was given the title of prodictator, which means acting dictator, and given but one task: stop Hannibal. In hindsight, Fabius appears to be one of the wisest military men in Rome because after closely studying the Roman defeats at Trebia and Trasimene, he knew better than to allow Hannibal to decide the conditions of battle.

Instead of assaulting this army of 56,000 with his much larger force, he shadowed Hannibal during his march through southern Italy, staying up on high defensible ridges and mountains rather than meeting them openly. With enough patience, his strategy probably would have succeeded in either forcing Hannibal to fight on Roman terms, or flee home before his forces dwindled or mutinied. Hannibal tried everything to force a Roman confrontation, pillaging and raiding the countryside and devastating the landscape the Romans had fought so hard in securing a few generations before. However, Fabius was not like the previous hot-blooded Romans that Hannibal had so easily goaded into a fight they couldn't win. His patience meant that the Carthaginian forces had to spend the winter in southern Italy, cut off from their supply and forced to forage in the snow.

The rest of Rome was not sold on Fabius' pragmatism, however, and as soon as his term as prodictator was up, he was denied reelection and two Consuls served in the executive, both of whom favored an aggressive strategy against Hannibal. They were authorized to raise eight instead of the traditional four legions, which comes to 40,000 heavy infantry. In addition, their subservient Latin allies were levied for an additional 40,000 foot soldiers, along with 6,000 Roman and Allied cavalry, so that they outnumbered the Carthaginian troops almost 2 to 1.

Hannibal seized a valuable supply depot in Cannae and the huge Roman army came to face him in open battle. There was some contention among the two Consuls who led the army, with Varro favoring a pitched battle anywhere, anytime, and Paullus favoring a more prudent course of waiting for a better opportunity. On his day of command, Varro ordered his troops into action, changing their formation somewhat to accommodate his sense of tactics. Since they were fighting on an open plain, he had the maniples, who were normally spread out to allow for greater movement and flexibility, pushed together and had the Principes come up close behind the Hastati in an almost-phalanx way.

Hannibal advanced his line to meet the enemy, forming his troops into a “v” formation, pointing their axis toward the Roman line. Varro, believing that this would allow his troops to punch through the line and surround the enemy, advanced his own troops hurriedly, hoping to catch Hannibal off guard. However, as the bold Romans charged, the Carthaginian troops at the very front fell back to the solid line behind them, causing the Romans to charge faster and lose their cohesion, thinking that the enemy was already running away. This gave an opportunity for Hannibal's cavalry to do its work. They charged the opposing Roman cavalry, who were fewer in number and not near as well-equipped, and caused them to rout without much difficulty. Here's a handy diagram to illustrate:

Then they turned their attention to the battle-frenzied infantry line, flanking the Triarii in the rear as they charged forward. Before the Romans had time to react, they were surrounded on all sides, in the center of a deadly crush of arms from both footmen and cavalry. The army was utterly destroyed, according to Polybius around 70,000 died and 10,000 captured with only a few thousand escaping, while Hannibal's forces only suffered around 8-9,000 casualties.

The Senate felt the need to deal with Hannibal quickly because they feared that the other Latin cities would join with Hannibal if he were allowed to roam unchecked for too long. Ironically, it was his victory at Cannae that motivated many former allies of Rome to switch sides and declare for Carthage, including Macedonia, Syracuse, and several Latin cities. After this decisive victory, the Romans saw the need for prudence and pursued a Fabian policy of containment, which was Hannibal's ultimate undoing as he continually tried to replenish his forces for a siege that would never succeed. In the end, it was only by using Hannibal's own tactics against him that the Romans would ever see victory in the Second Punic War.

Pax vobiscum

The Siege of Syracuse

Located in south-eastern Sicily, Syracuse was an old Corinthian-Greek Colony with old-time values. Ruled over by kings and tyrants since its founding in 733 BCE, Syracuse enjoyed the many benefits of its central Mediterranean locale and became very wealthy through trade with Egypt, Rome, Carthage, Asia Minor, Palestine, and Spain. After the Pyrrhic war in 275 BCE, however, it was the sole remaining Greek settlement west of the Peninsula itself, and in a very tenuous position sandwiched between Rome and Carthage.

Syracuse survived for quite a while after Pyrrhus' final defeat because its leaders made smart alliances and used skilled diplomacy to ensure the protection of either Rome or Carthage. When the first Punic War broke out, Syracuse was at the center of the action and made an alliance with Carthage from fear of Rome. Luckily, Rome and Carthage fought each other so bitterly that by the time Rome got around to dealing with the unlucky Sicilian Greeks, they had already lost so many in battle that they were willing to settle for an apology and a cut of their trade. However, when the second Punic War broke out, Syracuse made the mistake of allying with Carthage again, and the Romans were determined to make them pay. However, Roman vengeance would come at a high cost to the Republic because of one resident of Syracuse whose mind possessed knowledge that could bring both great prosperity and very great destruction. This man's name was Archimedes.

I like to think of Archimedes as a sort of ancient world Da Vinci, except without the moral qualms about creating weapons. Where Da Vinci was purposefully putting gears in the wrong place so that his designs would ultimately fail, Archimedes was not only sketching these out, but utilizing them to a terrible degree of success. For this week's Famous Friday, we'll delve into Archimedes' discoveries in greater detail, but since it's Military Monday, let's focus on his original and horrific siege weapons.

The most famous of his weapons was The Claw, which utilized pulleys and complicated weight balancing to capsize Roman Triremes. Seriously, this crane-like weapon would hook onto the bow or stern of the boat, lift it out of the water, and send it crashing against the nearby rocks. Each boat carried about two hundred soldiers, so you can imagine the carnage that ensued when this happened over and over:

Another of his creations was an improved catapult. Again, using pulleys and counterweights, he was able to create an engine capable of throwing a 500 pound rock with much better accuracy than the inferior Roman scorpions and ballistae. He also contributed to the building of other weapons which could fire missiles and keep the Romans at bay.

The most controversial of his creations was his 'death ray.' Several authorities have tested it using various techniques, and some have been successful, while most have ended in a wash. Supposedly, Archimedes built a large array of bronze mirrors which could be turned, focusing their reflected light into a concentrated beam onto an approaching ship. The Roman ships, which were sealed with tar, caught on fire and sunk. While this does seem a bit far-fetched, I wouldn't put it past old Archie to give it a try. After all, it was Hiero II, the king of Syracuse and relative of Archimedes, who frequently challenged the genius and gave him the funding he needed to build better weapons since the first Punic War, so why wouldn't this mathematician try literally everything he could think of? Were there easier ways to light ships on fire? Yeah, lots. But if I were an invading Roman, I might think twice about mixing it up with an enemy who can light my ships on fire without shooting anything.

Syracuse eventually fell to sheer Roman determination, and Archimedes was killed, possibly while drawing circles in the sand. If not for him, the last Greek colony on Italian soil would surely have fallen in the first year, and Carthage wouldn't have stood a chance of surviving the Second Punic War. By the time the Roman army came to the gates of Carthage, they had suffered so many casualties from Syracuse and from fighting Hannibal for ten years that they allowed Carthage to live, albeit under severe economic sanctions. And when Carthage was finally leveled in the Third Punic War, there were no more brilliant mathematicians around to set Romans on fire from a distance.

Pax vobiscum

Military Monday: The Early Maniples

The Phalanx had served Rome well. The Etruscans used it to dominate the early Romans in the 700's BCE, and the Romans were nothing if not very efficient copy-cats. So they worked toward overcoming Etruscan hegemony and in 509 BCE (or sometime thereabout), they succeeded in overthrowing their king and reforming their constitution to include separation of powers, election of Senators, and citizens' assemblies. Their Hoplite armies proceeded to subdue the cities in northern Italy, and established Roman hegemony in their region. However, the Phalanx proved problematic in several embarrassing battles.

The Roman Phalanx was arrayed with the wealthiest citizens in the front, center rank, which made sense because they had the best quality armor and weapons. A strong core meant a strong army, or so the wisdom of the time dictated. However, an army with weak flanks is just asking for trouble, which the Romans learned at a great cost at The Battle of the Allia around 390 BCE, where the Senone Gauls crushed their flanks and surrounded their core, killing them to the man. Later, in the Second Samnite War (326-304 BCE), the Romans learned from their enemies the value of small, flexible groups in a battle. And by learned from, I mean that they got beaten like little girls several times by these 'barbarians,' before numbers and brute force established their dominance over the hill country of central Italy.

So, whether through sweeping reforms as the later historians claimed, or through the more likely course of gradual tactical evolution, the Romans decided to do away with the single-line Phalanx and make way for a more effective army. This army would consist of three different types of heavy foot soldiers who were arrayed in three lines on the field in a checkerboard formation. Of particular concern, especially to the Roman upper-class, was the economic order of soldiers. Putting the most well-armed and protected soldiers in the front line made sense if you wanted the initial shock to truly penetrate the enemy line, but it meant that those soldiers may be unable to help if the battle was long and contentious. So the change in battle-lines began with placing the poorest of the soldiers (who were still members of that upper rung, just 'lower-upper' classmen) at the front of the army. These front-line soldiers were called Hastati, named for the spears they carried, the Hasta. Early on, all of the soldiers carried these spears, but the Hastati were likely named for it because they were at least wealthy enough to afford their own spear.

All of this would vary because all the equipment was self-provided, but a typical Hastati would be outfitted in leather armor and a bronze helmet, but no leg armor. Along with their Hasta, they would carry a scutum, one of those famous convex rectangular shields. After the Hastati was the Principe, who carried the same weapons, but had leg armor and chain-mail covering their torso, which was highly prized in the ancient world for giving protection without hindering mobility. The third line was composed of Triarii, who had the heaviest armor and highest quality weapons, and fought in a tight phalanx. The flanking units, who were above the Triarii, were the Equites, early cavalrymen rich enough to afford the best armor and weapons, and a horse. Incidentally, this is the reason that horse-related activities are referred to as “equestrian.”

Attached to each of the line soldiers was a compliment of Leves, or javelin-throwers who used light javelins to harass the enemy line before a charge. This proved especially effective against a Phalanx because it is hard to maintain a strong frontal formation while dodging javelins. Gaps could be exploited, and the enemy line could be divided and crushed. Discipline was essential for this kind of fighting, and lieutenants had to pay close attention to the banners and whistles coming from the main army to make sure their unit wasn't surrounded if there was a call to retreat. Training the individual soldiers took a few months out of the year, and it was considered the duty of the wealthy in Rome to protect the city and advance the Roman agenda throughout the world.

A typical Roman battle using the Camillian Maniples would go like this: Hastati charge, while Leves soften the line. If the Hastati couldn't break the enemy battle line, they would retreat in an organized fashion behind the Triarii in the back while the Principes charged forward, making their own attempt to crush the enemy. However, if they could not succeed, then they, too would retreat and the Triarii would charge.

Usually the Triarii could luxuriate behind the battle line and watch the show, but if a battle was going poorly enough for them to get involved, it was not a good sign. A Latin idiom meaning 'to be in a desperate situation' is ' rem ad Triarios redisse,' which literally means, 'it has come to the Triarii.' For example, "How close are you to getting out of debt?” “It has come to the Triarii.” Try it next time someone asks you about a hopeless situation, and the look on their face should lift your spirits nicely!

As well as this primitive strategy worked, it couldn't last forever. And as you may have guessed, it was  humiliating defeat that forced the Romans once again to renew their tactical and strategic methods and ensure their dominance of the Mediterranean. Hannibal, in particular, played a part in bringing the spearmen-based Maniples to an end, especially after a huge Roman army was crushed at the Battle of Cannae.

However, despite the resounding defeats they suffered, what kept Roman culture and influence alive for more than a thousand years was their ability to adapt. It's true that their pride was gravely wounded by massive defeats (especially from the 'barbarians'), but eventually they got over themselves, went back to the drawing board, and found something that worked. And the coming reform of the Legions meant that the class preference in the Roman army would be destroyed for a merit-based seniority system.

Pax vobiscum

Famous Friday: Pomp(ey) and Circumstance

Toward the beginning of the 100's CE, the Roman army was radically redesigned by Gaius Marius, who changed the rules and forever changed Rome. Prior to these reforms, in order to serve in the Roman army, you had to be a member of the upper class, own a significant plot of land, and provide your own weapons and armor. Marius opened the ranks to all classes of Romans, promising land and plunder to whoever signed up. The army was thus transformed from an elite institution into a social ladder by which “new men” could earn money and fame for themselves and climb the class structure. One of these new men was Gnaeus Pompeius Strabo, the father of Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, known by his more common title, Pompey the Great.

Pompey was only nineteen when his father was killed during a Roman civil war. He inherited a massive and wealthy estate and after two marriages, was swiftly climbing to the most powerful ranks of Roman society. His father-in-law, Lucius Cornelius Sulla, had distinguished himself by winning the first Mithridatic war in Greece and Asia Minor, and had several uses in mind for Pompey. Sulla became the Dictator of Rome and sent Pompey to secure the empire from further rebellions and civil strife.

First on the to-do list was Sicily, which supplied Rome with necessary grain. Next was North Africa, Numidia to be specific, where Pompey excelled at achieving victory with his legions. However, this presented a problem when he returned to Rome wanting a triumphal entry because he was a privatus, that is, just a private citizen with no Senate-seat or Senate-given titles and for him to be granted a parade was actually illegal. Sulla decided to allow it only after he and another general were finished with their own parades. When the day arrived, Pompey was embarrassed by a late start because of an incident with an elephant-driven chariot. It seems that the gates of Rome were too narrow for the elephant to fit, so he had to make a few last-minute changes.

A few years after Sulla's death, he asked for the title of Proconsular Imperium of Hispania (that's Spain and Portugal) so that he might crush an ongoing Roman rebellion in that area. The Senate was beginning to fear this young upstart who gloried in military triumphs but seemed to have no interest in becoming a Senator or going the traditional rout of Roman leadership. They also didn't wish to offend the general in Hispania who already held that title, thus giving them another rebellion on their hands. However, as he refused to disband his legions until they agreed to his title, they acquiesced, hoping that perhaps he would meet his end in Iberia. They were mistaken, of course, and Pompey destroyed the rebellion in five years.

Enter Spartacus. While I do plan on writing more about this slave-general in future weeks, this will be minimal. The Third Servile War was underway in Italy, with Spartacus as its leader. Crassus, another future Famous Friday subject, had faced the Gladiator/Slave army and defeated it, killing Spartacus in the process. Pompey was making his way back to Rome, and encountered the remnants of the enemy army, capturing about five thousand of them. He brought them into Rome as his slaves, and claimed credit for wiping out the rebellion for good. Crassus, needless to say, was not amused.

Pompey was then granted his second (but still illegal) triumphal entry by the Senate, who continued to fear the influence he had with the common people of Rome, the mob. In an attempt to domesticate this brilliant warrior, they elected him Consul, despite the fact that it was a Senate-only office and Pompey had never even been elected Senator. He ruled the Senate as a Consul right alongside his fellow Consul and longtime anti-fan, Crassus. It seems that the Senate believed the two would cancel each other out, their fame would fade with time, and they could be swept from office in a few years. Unfortunately, Pompey and Crassus both desired power, and they proved willing to work with even each other to attain it.

Just when it seemed like Rome's enemies had all been contained, the problem of piracy began to re-emerge in the Mediterranean. Two years after his Consul-ship, Pompey was given command of a naval task force designed to obliterate piracy completely. It was another controversial appointment for the still unelected general, but it passed through the Senate albeit by narrow margins thanks to Julius Caesar (who hadn't become Caesar yet). Whether they liked Pompey or not, they couldn't argue with results. Short version of Pompey's naval command: Pirates lose, Pompey wins, no more pirates for awhile. This, of course, made him popular with the masses once again and left his Senatorial enemies wringing their hands over what to do.

Meanwhile, back in Pontus, the third war against Mithridates the Great was going swimmingly well for one Lucius Lucinius Lucullus (who, I'm guessing, didn't appreciate being called 'Lucy'). However, his troops were growing weary and insubordinate after years of fighting without much to show for it, and Rome was starting to doubt his ability to subdue Asia Minor and the East. He had been chasing Mithridates VI around the countryside, only to learn that he had sought refuge at the court of Tigranes II, the king of Armenia. So he sent an arrogant letter to Tigranes demanding that he produce Mithridates, which Tigranes refused. Then, after fighting with the Armenians for a few years, he also failed to capture Tigranes. Thus, he was replaced by Pompey, who chased Mithridates all the way to Colchis, in the northern Black Sea coast. He still didn't capture the last Pontic king, but he didn't waste any time. He set up Roman-style governing authorities to replace the Pontic nobles and went about conquering Syria, Palestine, and Judea. Afterwards, he returned to Rome, had some more parades, and allied with Julius and Crassus to form the Great Triumvirate which would eventually bring an end to the Republic and usher in the age of Emperors. I'll write more about this in a few weeks when we take a look at Julius Caesar.

While Pompey was certainly skilled at all matters military, politics brought about his eventual undoing. The Great Triumvirate worked well while it lasted, but just like the Highlanders, there can be only one. Caesar practically chased Pompey out of Rome, and once he secured his family, he debated where to go next. He decided on Egypt, which was being ruled by the Greek Ptolemies, and fled there with Caesar's Triremes close behind. When he set foot on the shore, he was stabbed to death by the Egyptian “welcoming party.” The Pharoah thought it best to dispatch Pompey and present his body to Caesar, thus preventing a large-scale pitched war in their country.

Caesar, so the story goes, was not happy about Pompey's death, even though they had become enemies. He put his assassins to death and gave Pompey's remains over to his wife, who took his ashes back to his country home in Alba. His reputation was that of a great and famous general who fought for Rome and whose life ended ultimately as a tragedy.

Pax vobiscum

Technology Tuesday: The Scythed Chariot

If you ever read accounts of early white American colonists and their scuffles with the native peoples, you may be surprised to find out just how often the colonists won battles despite being outnumbered by huge margins. Sometimes, this was because the colonists would target women and children instead of warriors, but when they did face native warriors, they won because of weaponry. Now, if you've ever watched a demonstration of a musket from the 1600's, you know that hitting anything with that unwieldy, smooth-bored weapon would be pretty impressive, even from ten feet away. But the shot itself is only half of the musket's usefulness; the other half is the bang. The Native Americans had a natural fear of smoke during battle because fire is an uncontrollable force of nature. The muskets give a loud report followed by clouds of white smoke and even if it didn't cause mass casualties, it usually caused enough fear to lead to a rout within a few volleys, often less. So it was with the ancient world that there were some weapons useful for their practical effectiveness in battle and others which, though they did not inflict great physical damage, caused fear and panic.

One such weapon of fear is the Scythed Chariot, brought to Asia Minor from Persia during the Greco-Persian wars. Civilian chariots were a status symbol in Rome, and in most of ancient Europe. Owning a horse was an expensive venture by itself, much less owning enough to pull you comfortably along in your little convertible boxcar. They were also used in races in the hippodrome, as seen on Ben Hur. The design of the chariot varied considerably depending upon its use, and the Scythed Chariot's use was to plow through tightly packed enemy formations to break them apart and to slaughter men in large numbers.

A typical Scythed Chariot was built very heavy, since it was made for combat. Four horses (usually heavily armored) would pull a large, sturdy boxcar with two or three soldiers inside, one to drive and the others to protect the driver. The wheels of the chariot were large and spoked, and attached to both sides of the axles were one or more three-to-five foot blades. You can imagine the carnage that would ensue if even one of these monstrosities successfully charged a tightly-packed Phalanx.

Spears, and especially the long Macedonian spears, could be effective in slowing the charge, but only by a coordinated defense could these frightening inventions be countered. Each had the charging power of four heavy horses, and even if the first two were injured, the momentum they created would still cause the bladed wheels to tear through men like fire to dried underbrush. Alexander the Great faced them when he pushed into Persia during his conquest, and he formulated an effective containment solution. His Phalanxes would move into an E-shaped formation, focusing the small center column against the vicious chariots. When the densely-packed group would slow the chariot's initial charge, The outside columns would flank it and kill the drivers and horses. This was effective, but costly, and not every center column was able to stand their ground as they needed to.

The Romans had a better counter: move out of the way. Their army was structured like their society; efficient. Their forces were disciplined, and they had a clearly-defined command structure. Their flexible formations gave them a great advantage over these heavy weapons, which were not easily maneuverable.

During the Mithridatic Wars, Mithridates VI made the mistake of using his Scythed Chariots in an initial charge, thinking to thin the Roman lines for his foot troops. Instead, the Romans moved out of the chariots' way at the last second, allowing them to pass through their ranks and into rough ground behind them that they had lined with stakes. Many of the chariots stopped in time, but were pretty easily dispatched by a few Triarii who were waiting for them. The Roman army taunted their Pontic enemy, cheering for the chariots as if they were watching a race. This fearful weapon had failed to bring victory, and Mithridates ended up losing that battle, his troops being demoralized to see their fellow soldiers slaughtered and mocked.

The Scythe Chariot was not finished with history at this point, however, and Mithridates' son Pharnaces II actually utilized them effectively against a Roman army himself much later. However, they were costly to maintain and the fear they created wasn't sufficient to infect Roman troops, so as Rome conquered the East, they fell out of style and practice as a suitable weapon. Eventually, the Romans thought of better things they could place on the chariots instead of blades; siege weapons. Yes, they later strapped ballistae (kind of a big crossbow) to the backs of their wagons and used them as the world's first known mobile artillery.

Pax vobiscum

Military Monday: The Early Army of Mithridates VI

The army of Pontus reflected the Kingdom itself, and even its king: it was a mixture of different fighting men with different styles, cultures, and ideas. In the best of circumstances, this mix led to sweeping victory, but in the end, it led to ultimate defeat. Fancying himself the heir of Alexander the Great, Mithridates VI followed Alex's tendency to augment his army with whatever kind of troops he conquered along the way. While this worked well for Alexander, it should be noted that Mithridates lived considerably longer and this region had been changing for almost three hundred years since the young Macedonian conqueror.

Asia Minor was and remains a land of many peoples. Considered prime colonial ground by the Greeks, it had an unmistakable flavor of Hellenist-style learning, fighting, and worship. However, there were also Persian colonists there, left-over from Darius' invasion years before Alexander. And this is all in combination with the native peoples, who were primarily tribal, though growing more and more agrarian and urban, forsaking their nomadic ways. In order to unite these people, Mithridates would often resort to xenophobia, at least the anti-Roman variety, thus giving them a common enemy. Here, truly, was a wise student in the art of war.

After he had conquered some of the Balkan region to the North, Mithridates looked to securing his borders in the south. So he made plans, along with Nicomedes III, the king of western neighbor Bithynia, to divy up the area called Cappadocia, just south of Pontus, between the two of them. Mithridates' sister was ruling as regent because her husband had just died. Nicomedes, being a cunning king himself, decided to marry the sister instead, leaving one of his sons in charge of the region.

The two men sent representatives to Rome to resolve the dispute, leaving Nicomedes in a position of comfort, thinking that there would be no battle until their dignitaries returned. Mithridates waited for a time, then invaded Cappadacia outright, and its puppet king was killed in the ensuing fight. This enraged the Romans in the area, who helped Nicomedes raid and burn several towns and settlements in southern Pontus as punishment for his invasion.

Mithridates was more than capable of stopping this looting, but instead he allowed it to happen. Nicomedes ravaged the countryside while the Pontic king merely took reports and made preparations. He knew that the Romans would likely move against him on the pretense of aiding Bithynia, and so he spread word far and wide that those villages had been pillaged under Roman advice, thus uniting the varied people of Pontus against Rome, and Bithynia, her handmaiden. Raising an army was easy for him at this point; those who had their crops and livestock stolen by the Bithynian raiders were only too happy to take up a spear and get some of it back, with interest.

Sure enough, the three Roman generals whose armies were in various parts of Asia Minor all moved against Pontus with the hope of quelling Mithridates VI. The three armies were probably about forty thousand each, along with Nicomedes' army which was reportedly fifty thousand foot, six thousand horse. If they had all joined together to take on this rogue Pontic despot, they may have had a chance. But in their anger, and without waiting for orders from the Roman Senate, they took him on individually, along with his army of two hundred and fifty thousand foot and forty thousand horse. He crushed them one by one, capturing their generals and subjecting them to horrible, humiliating treatment.

His footmen were likely Phalanx pikemen at the core, along with lighter armed auxiliaries and javilineers. The javelin-throwers of Pontus were legendary for their accuracy, and the deadliness of their weapons. The horsemen he employed were mostly, probably all, javelin-armed and heavily armored, capable of forming a kind of highly-mobile Phalanx which disrupted enemy formations with missiles before charging home at their flanks. His tactics were most likely pin-and-fork, using the heavy spearmen to hold the enemy in place while his horses harassed their flanks and caused a rout. He may have also had some Scythian horse archers in his ranks, recruited when he defeated them in the Bosporus up north, and if that were the case, their contribution would have been immeasurable. They were a Steppe people; born in the saddle and taught to ride and shoot from a very young age. Their accuracy was high, and their tactics were notorious: they would pretend to retreat in a panic, only to outrun their pursuers while shooting them with their poisoned arrows. No matter Mithridates' tactics, the comparatively small armies of Rome and Bithynia didn't stand a chance.

Because of this conquest, all of Asia Minor was under his control. He moved swiftly to secure the loyalties of Greek colonies in the western regions, and sent representatives to gain alliances with the Greek cities, who had been living almost a hundred years under Roman hegemony. They eagerly agreed, giving Mithridates a buffer region with which to hold back immediate Roman retaliation.

Unfortunately for him, when Rome did retaliate, they took all of Greece back, but signed a treaty with him that left him in control of Asia Minor. Though he accomplished much and did a lot to unify such a diverse group, it seems that their divisions were stronger than a mutual hatred of Rome. Mithridates the Great himself spoke at least twenty-two languages, which apparently was necessary just to communicate with all the captains in his army!

In the ensuing Mithridatic Wars, the Romans repeatedly punished Pontus with their manipular legions and flexible tactics. Eventually, trouble within his own household was Mithridates' undoing as he was betrayed by Pharnaces, his illegitimate son.

Opinion of this warlord varies, depending on the source. Some look upon him as just another petty king trying to build an empire and advance his own name. Others see him as a kind of freedom fighter against Roman imperial oppression. Personally, the jury's out for me. I think he was much smarter than the average despot, yet his cruelty toward Romans, both military and civilian, cannot be overlooked. It should be noted, however, that he never referred to himself with the surtitle “the Great.” That was something the Romans did shortly after he died. It seems that though they were enemies, there was something about this man that they deeply respected.

Pax vobiscum

Famous Friday: Mithridates VI, Alexander's Last Heir

I don't blame Rome for conquering the world. Sure, they did some terrible things along the way and their very name became synonymous for oppression, but I don't really think it was all their fault. Rome, not unlike Sparta, had the practice of ensuring its security by serious, disciplined military training, and using slaves to handle the menial work of growing food and tending to the livestock (although Rome's slavery was nowhere near the scale of Sparta's!). This meant that, in the same way that the Peloponnese city-states all wanted to be Sparta's ally when it was strong, the emerging powers of the Mediterranean wanted to be counted among Rome's friends. When a conflict would break out involving one of Rome's allies, they would often call for help and Rome would send and army. Eventually, to save on time and travel expenses, the Romans just built an outpost nearby and eventually saw to all that nagging day-to-day governance stuff.

Ergo (+100 Latin bonus points!), if there was a destabilized area in the Mediterranean from about 200 BCE onward, you could bet that it wouldn't be long before the Romans would lend a hand. Asia Minor circa 90 BCE was one such area where local conflict and civil strife were both common. It was a land of many cultures, having been conquered by both the Persians and Greeks respectively over the previous 500 years, and there was still a significant local population who had their own customs and philosophies. To the Romans, who admittedly had begun to look toward the expansion of their already impressive empire, it looked like a good land for up-and-coming politicians to get noticed through conquest.

So it was that Lucius Cornelius Sulla found himself far from home on the Asian frontier facing off against a mighty Pontic king who had somehow unified these diverse people and formed an army. Mithridates VI, also called Eupator, stood before him proud and defiant, refusing to repent for his slaughter of Roman civilian colonists in the terrible massacre that Appian refers to as the “Asiatic Vespers.” It is important to note that though this act certainly qualifies Mithridates VI as a cruel, petty despot, it was not without pretense from the Romans themselves

Though they admired Greek thought and borrowed their mythology, the Romans were notoriously merciless in their dealings with Greek settlements. In 167 BCE, the Greek colony of Epirus was sacked and all its inhabitants enslaved. In 146 BCE, they destroyed Corinth. Not to mention the slaughter of Archimedes at Syracuse. Though I don't believe the Romans always sought the wars that entangled them, they certainly didn't go to war without real commitment.

Before continuing our tale of the small kingdom of Pontus versus the mighty empire of Rome, let's explore Mithridates as a person, that we might better understand this man and why he did such terrible things. First of all, let's explore the area where he was born.

The light purple is his empire at its most expansive. The dark purple represents where he started. Clearly, this was a man who knew how to exert his influence without the aid of Roman interlopers. His heritage probably has a lot to do with his disdain for all things Roman.

Mithridates was a descendant of Alexander the Great on his father's side, and this was a fact he took great pride in. It helped him to recruit the Greeks living in Asia Minor, as they grew up hearing stories from their parents about mighty Alexander and how he conquered the world. On his mother's side, he was a descendant of Darius I, a mighty Persian conqueror. This helped him to win support from Persians, and also from the Asians. Thus, Mithridates set himself up as the heir of both the Macedonian empire and the Persian empire, which was a powerful political and rhetorical weapon.

His father died when he was only 14, and it is believed that he left his home soon afterward for a time. His mother ruled in his stead as a regent, and meanwhile sold large portions of the Pontic territory to Rome, who was eager to stake their claim on the East. The city of Laodicea is named after her.

Six years after his father's death, Mithridates VI either came of age or returned to his throne (since it's unclear whether he ever really left) and threw his mother in prison. He did not approve of the partitioning of the kingdom, and he especially didn't want to involve the Romans. He desired to defeat them, to overturn a hundred years of virtually unchallenged Mediterranean hegemony and establish a new Helleno-Persian Empire that would rule in its place. But first, he would have to unite Asia, carefully maintaining a balance between diplomacy and outright conquest.

First, he turned his eye to the north, knowing that it would be impossible to reunite Asia without a base of power in the form of money. So, in exchange for protection, he raised and sent an army to drive the Scythians out of Crimea and the Eastern Baltic region. The Bosporans, who lived in that area for many years, eagerly accepted this help because the Scythians had long been their bitter rivals; mostly horse archers who fought with poison arrows and had a raiding-based economy. They were kind of like ancient land-based vikings. Mithridates' army succeeded, thanks to the leadership of Diophantes, one of his greatest generals. Thanks to him, the Rhoxolanoi, a Scythian ally, also accepted Pontic rule. Now that he had cut his teeth on northern politics and warfare, he was ready to mix it up with the locals.

Nicomedes III ruled Bithynia at the time, and Mithridates initially meant to ally with him. Nicomedes proved himself a friend of Rome, however, and so a war broke out between them. Mithridates met Nicomedes on the battlefield, and the Pontic army consistently defeated the poorly-trained Bithynians, who were scattered like chaff in the wind. So it was that Nicomedes chose to enlist Rome's help directly, corresponding with them and begging for relief from the Pontic tyrant. Rome, having received a request for help, gladly obliged and thus began Mithridates' direct struggle with the Empire.

Next week, we will take a detailed look at the tactics and customs of the Pontic peoples, with their Greek Phalanxes, Peltasts, and Scythe Chariots. As this week turned out to be a “Greek Week,” next week will be mostly a “Mithridates VI Week.” Stay tuned, and stay safe.

Pax vobiscum

Technorati Tags: ancient, history, Mithridates, Eupator, empire, Rome

Culture Wednesday: Sparta - The Phobiopolis

Few of my friends still make the mistake of mentioning any recent 'historical' movie in my presence. I don't get invited if that's what they're going to see, and if anyone brings it up in conversation, someone else in the group is quick to silence them if I'm around. This is because I hate (HATE) pretty much all modern movies based on historical events. And that includes the most recent Greek tale of heroics and glory, 300.

But wait, before you go back to the lolcats and delete my feed, hear this: I solemnly swear not to make this entire post about how inaccurate and terrible this movie was. However, you should be aware that it will come up. This is not a movie review, just a second look at the Spartans, through the lens of reality rather than romance. Let's start with Sparta's economy.

Every Spartan male was part of the army. From age 7 or so, they would live in the barracks and learn to be ruthless, survivalist warriors. However, if everyone is a Hoplite, who grows the food? Who trades? Well, the Spartan warriors that so many have come to revere and admire were slavers, plain and simple. Sometime very near the founding of Sparta, the surrounding indigenous people, later known as Helots, were enslaved and forced to work on the farms that dotted the Spartan countryside. They wore dog-skin hats and out-numbered the Spartans about 10 to 1 by most estimates. And periodically, just to keep things interesting, the leaders of Sparta would call for a mass execution. Or some soldiers would just kill a few Helots for amusement.

Some historians have claimed that the Helots, though no doubt resistant to their captivity at first, gradually grew to believe the Spartan propaganda that they were less than human and lived only to obey. The number of Helot rebellions seems to squish this theory like a fat, slow bug, however, and I can't bring myself to imagine anyone enjoying slavery. On top of the rebellions, the Spartans themselves would always bear their spear and shield when walking around the city at night, only unbuckling their shields when they were safely within the walls of their own home. That's how seriously they took the threat of being murdered secretly by a group of Helots.

Of course, slavery was common in ancient times, and the Greeks had several different words for slave, ranging from a slave captured in battle to an indentured servant. No one was as cruel to their slaves as the Spartans, though, which has raised a number of questions dealing with their unabashed oppression.

First, why the wanton violence toward the unarmed slaves? Why did they give them annual beatings regardless of their behavior? I believe the answer is fear. The Spartans, under all their armor, chutzpah, and rigorous training were nothing more than a bunch of frightened people trying desperately to obtain some sense of control.

The day-to-day Spartan lifestyle is pretty famous, and is the one thing I will give credit to 300 for portraying correctly. When they were not campaigning, they lived very simple lives as if they always lived in camp. They wore burlap-like clothes, and even their kings lacked the jewels and pomp of their Eastern neighbors. This is why the Spartans were never bribed with money; they didn't use it. Gold was just a shiny metal to them, and they scorned the opulence of Athens and Corinth. Even today, Spartan has become an adjective for someone who lives on the barest necessities.

They craved military power, to the point of conscripting the entire free population permanently. Their army was their most valuable commodity, and it set them apart from their neighbors. To have the Spartans in your alliance was a good reason for your enemies to negotiate. Their Phalanxes were near unbreakable, and their armor was heavy and durable. However, while we interpret military strength as a reason for security, that same thought reveals the insecurity of building up a military in the first place. Why build such a massive, professional force if you have nothing to fear? It was in fear that they trained, and a pure cynical ploy to motivate the troops by the council of Elders to leave the city with no walls (claiming Sparta's fighting men are its walls).

They practiced infanticide for those babies who had deformities or were crippled from birth. This practice horrifies us today, and no one will defend a mother who has left her baby in a dumpster by saying that she is just being “spartan.” Surely they could find work for a child that was disabled, the same way that the Japanese, for example, would train their blind people in the art of massage and acupuncture? But common work is not for Spartans; it is for Helots. The Spartans are born to fight or they are killed after birth. This, too, was fear at work. Fear of weakness, fear of social change, and fear of subjugation.

So the next time you watch a movie or read a book portraying those gallant, rugged, and noble Spartans defending their homeland or joining their allies to defend Greece, don't be taken in by the romantic view that started, I believe, with the Renaissance. Remember the Helot, who lived in daily fear of his life. Remember the baby whose life was taken because he was deemed unfit to live. Remember, most of all, the founders and leaders who would take the freedom of ten times their number just to ensure their own.

Pax vobiscum

Technorati Tags: sparta, fear, slavery, oppression

Spears of the Ancient World - More than Just Pointy Sticks

Thousands of years ago, a hunter was looking for a better way to kill things. So, he found a long stick and tied a sharp rock to one end of it, and used it to kill some food. From such humble origins, the spear has been humanity's weapon of choice for millennia, and that tradition is carried on today (sort of) with bayonets. For the sake of clarity and brevity, today I will focus on three kinds of spears common to the ancient world – 2 Greek and 1 Roman.

Dory – This five- to ten-foot weapon with a iron leaf-head point is the spear of the original Hoplite. It only weighed between 2 and 4 lbs., making it a very versatile and nimble tool. It was the choice weapon of the Greeks, and it served them well for generations. A big bonus to the shorter Dory is that you don't need a lot of training to use it. Sure, you may want to know where to stab people to cause the most damage, but its small size makes it easy to wield and self-preservation does the rest.

While the levies could get away with using instinct in battle, the line soldiers had to be disciplined in both its use and the execution of a solid Phalanx. The Dory had a small bronze spike on the butt which could be pinned into the ground during an enemy charge. Also, if your Dory broke, you could just flip the short spiked end around and use it as a short-range spear.

The longer Dory was used by professional soldiery in the Greco-Persian and Peloponnesian wars. Being heavier and more unwieldy, it took some training to use properly, and you also needed Phalanx training. These spears allowed the Greeks to drive off Xerxes' invasion since they were longer than their Persian counterparts. Once again, longer spears = greater killing range = victory (usually). The Dory served the Greeks well for hundreds of years, but it was outmatched by evolution, which brought about a longer spear that made a 32-year-old Macedonian into the ruler of the Eastern world.

Sarissa – The mighty spears of Phillip II and Alexander the Great could measure between 13 and 21 feet and weigh between 10 and 15 lbs. Because of its size and weight, soldiers needed a lot of training to both use the spear effectively, and march in Phalanx with them. Without a disciplined army, you may as well use your Sarissas to build a wall instead.

Being a very long and heavy spear, Hoplites needed to use both hands to wield it, leaving them more vulnerable to arrows and javelins. The solution was an uncomfortable one: the soldiers would wear a shield that was slung around their necks. Like their predecessor, the Dory, the Sarissa also had a bronze “lizard killer” spike on the hilt to prevent charges and to provide a secondary weapon if (more like when) the spear would break.

The Sarissa evolved into the pike and lance in later times, but never really made it into widespread use the way that the Dory did. The most obvious reason for this is the training commitment. If you have a village full of hunters and farmers, you can hand them Dories and teach them the Phalanx and you won't have too rough of a time. If you give them a two-handed spear and a heavy shield to wear around their neck, however, you have a lot more work to do. The Phalanx peaked with the introduction of the Sarissa, and gradually became outmoded by other types of warfare.

Hasta – The Roman spear evolved from the Dory without a doubt, but they went in a different direction. The average length for a spear like this was 6 ½ feet long, while they opted for larger, oval-shaped shields to defend themselves. The Roman Phalanxes, which comprised early Rome's army, never went toe-to-toe with the Greeks (as far as we know), which is why they could keep their spears short.

The Hasta varied depending on the wealth of its owner. The wealthier Romans used spears with Iron cores, making them near-impossible to break. The less-wealthy opted for simple wood-and-bronze spears, with the butt-spike necessary to stop charging enemies. Every man in early Rome's army possessed a spear, however, since they also used the Phalanx tactic of the Greeks. But the Romans, unlike the Greeks, didn't allow military tradition to dictate the composition of their army.

The Roman weapons and tactics were based on who they were fighting and where. The mountainous terrain of Italy doesn't lend itself to the shoulder-to-shoulder formation of the Phalanx, so they needed flexibility or they would have no hope of defeating local tribes like the Samnites (more on them next week!). So they looked into different weapon technology while continuing to use the spear as a staple.

That is not to say they just moved on! The possession of a spear, and the knowledge to use it effectively, was paramount to early Roman armies. Though little is known about their origins, their mythology indicates that they were a martial people, and they clearly took spear training as a serious matter. Though they modified their Hastas later into javelins and cavalry lances, the spear remained their symbol of war and pride.

Pax vobiscum

Military Monday: Phillip II's Phavorite Phormation

Say you're an ancient Mediterranean warlord getting ready for a campaign and you've mustered a few thousand spear-men through levies and conscription. Now what? You could just march them straight into combat, that is, if you enjoy playing dice with peoples' lives. Or, if you are serious about gaining a victory with minimal losses, you'll use a disciplined formation; you will teach them the Phalanx.

Several ancient cultures, especially the Greeks and Romans, utilized this formation as the core of their strategy. A Phalanx is a group of spear-men who stand in rank shoulder to shoulder and shield to shield, their spears pointed in a unified direction, creating a wall of spear-points. If something happened to the front rank, the second rank would step up to take their place. It started as a simple idea, but simple ideas have a way of evolving when they come into contact with the right people.

The Phalanx came into its own with Phillip II of Macedon, a charismatic, smart Greek warlord and Alexander the Great's absentee father. Under his leadership, the Kingdom of Macedon expanded and conquered much of the Greek peninsula, and he showed no signs of slowing down. Macedon had been a relatively obscure power until he came along, after being educated in warfare while he was a hostage in Thebes. He had learned how a simple switch in traditional strategy had given the Thebans victory over the mighty Spartans and therefore, hegemony over the entire Greek world.

The Spartans always placed their most experienced and elite forces on their right-most flank, but this was a tradition with no strategic purpose. The Thebans took advantage and placed their most elite directly against them, bolstering those ranks with common soldiers as well. The Spartans' right flank crumbled and the rest is, well, history.

The Phalanx was more than just a bunch of guys with spears playing follow the leader though: there were several strategies that they could employ to adjust to their situation. Marching against archers? Bunch up closer to give a smaller target. What if the enemy infantry charges? Macedonian Spears, or sarissas had a short spike on their hilt (called a “lizard killer”) which you could stick in the ground, allowing the enemy to impale themselves on your spears without giving ground. Good order in a Phalanx generally led to victory, and likewise bad order led to certain defeat.

One-sided formations work well as long as the enemy is only attacking from that one direction. However, the sides and rear of the Phalanx were wide open, and unless the lieutenant saw a flank coming and had time to turn the men, they would most likely be scattered and routed by a charge of cavalry or even lightly-armed reinforcements.

Heavy armor was essential for the Hoplites of Phillip's (and later Alexander's) army. Their early conquests were against fellow Greeks who also employed Phalanxes, albeit with inferior equipment (more on this tomorrow). In Phalanx vs. Phalanx, the most important things are quality of weapons, durability of armor, and the discipline of the troops. They would march to each other and then repeatedly strike using brisk stabbing motions, hammering away at their opposition. If a front-rank soldier became afraid, there was nowhere to run, and panic nearly always leads to crushing defeat.

When Phillip II returned from Thebes, he secured his realm and immediately began a rigorous training program for his soldiers. They became experts at the Phalanx, which their leader used to a devastating effect on the battlefield. Their discipline gave them a sense of security on the field, while their leader's charisma gave them confidence.

Alexander the Great owed much to his father. But, although Phillip II built the machine, young Alex would drive it to great fame, which the ancient Greeks desired above all else. This wasn't just a case of a spoiled teenager winning a race with daddy's Bentley, however. Alexander improved on his father's tactics and made them work so well that he regularly won against superior forces. The main way he accomplished this was by a tactic similar to what the Medieval strategists called the Pin and Fork. One of Alexander's Phalanxes would engage an enemy Phalanx, while another unit would flank them . . . or Phlank them [/pun]. However, he did not allow the power of the Phalanx to seduce him into relying on it alone. As he passed through Asia minor, (and by passed through, I mean conquered) he would add local units to his army, taking advantage of their strengths and leading even his vanquished to victory. Using the Phalanx as a core, this young man was able to conquer all of Asia Minor, Palestine, the entire Fertile Crescent, and get all the way to the border of India. Then he drank himself to death, or was poisoned, at the age of 32 while returning home to take a break between victories.

Of course, all things must come to an end, and progress is no respecter of tradition. The Romans, who had also grown very powerful by utilizing the Phalanx, set their eyes on expanding further. They began using larger shields, javelins, and a 3-line infantry tactic that could crush an army of Phalanxes by flanking, dividing, and conquering. Using these and other techniques (stay tuned, kids!), they drove many of the Greek colonists out of Italy and ruled over those that remained. And just as the Phalanx began in Greece and spread to India, Rome's tactics met with success the world over.

Pax vobiscum