The Genius of Hannibal

I thought I'd take some time out today to simply marvel at one of history's most famous tacticians. Hannibal's genius cannot be understated, in my opinion: he was a man far ahead of his time and culture, and had his family been positioned a little more favorably within Carthaginian politics, it seems likely that history would remember the Second Punic War as the event that ended Roman expansion and brought the rogue Italian superpower to heel, paving the way for Phoenician hegemony throughout the Mediterranean.

The Barca family had a reputation as fierce fighters and noble warriors. However, Carthaginian culture was largely based on trading and the mighty city trained only a small percentage of its residents as professional soldiers, hiring most of the work of battle out to mercenary groups. Hence, though Hannibal's father Hamilcar fought the last eight years of the First Punic War with virtually no support from Carthage itself, his sacrifice and continual victories counted for little in the eyes of Carthaginian politicians, who allowed him an expedition in Spain after the war mostly to get rid of him. Young Hannibal joined his father in this conquest, and spent most of his adolescent years encamped with the soldiers, who took a liking to the young warrior and trained him in every weapon they could. Thus, when Hannibal one day took up his father's reigns and led the army, he commanded strong personal loyalty from them and there is no report of mutiny among his troops to be found in recorded history.

I like to believe that Hannibal's military education was two-fold: he likely learned about the more efficient “guerilla” tactics from his father, and the more practical, battlefield realities from the encamped soldiers. Thus, we have events like the Battle of Trebia, in which Hannibal hid some allied forces to execute an ambush against the already engaged Roman infantry, whom he had also deprived of their morning breakfast and forced to walk through the freezing Trebia river. That battle alone combines many elements from Hannibal's likely upbringing: the ambush tactics his father perfected, plus knowing that an unfed army poses little threat to a well-supplied force.

The biggest innovation in Roman tactics of that time was the maniple system, which allowed different lines of infantry to assault the enemy's front lines while having an avenue to fall back should the battle prove difficult. While they did deploy cavalry on their wings, their only purpose was to engage the enemy cavalry. This helped to win many battles, but was still essentially focused on the enemy's front. Hannibal knew that his forces would eventually be facing larger numbers, and so he focused on mobility, harassment, and flanking.

His wisdom in fighting battles also extended to knowing when he could not win. While Fabius was struggling to contain him in southern Italy, Hannibal tricked one of the containment armies by attaching torches to a herd of oxen and driving them through the forest at night. Thinking it was the enemy army preparing an ambush, the legions followed the torches, determined to out-ambush this troublesome Carthaginian. While they were busy chasing oxen, Hannibal led his forces through the now undefended pass and made for resupply in the north.

The saying goes that amateurs study tactics, while professionals study logistics. Unfortunately for Hannibal, he never fully secured supply lines from Carthage, and had to repeatedly fight for resupply from the Gauls or whichever Italian city decided to join him that week. Though he spent an impressive ten years in Italy campaigning successfully against the Romans, it was only a matter of time until the Romans took the war to Carthage, giving command to the unorthodox general Scipio Africanus, who would use Hannibal's own tactics to gain a victory over Carthage and Hannibal at the Battle of Zama.

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The Other Italians

Before the rise of Rome and its Empire, Italy was filled with a multitude of people groups, mostly tribal and nomadic, but united in themselves by common language and culture. One such people was the Samnites, whose culture was a combination of urban and tribal elements. They maintained their political independence until the Third Samnite War circa 290 BCE, when their land was taken by the Romans for good.

The Samnites worshiped the typical Greco-Roman Pantheon, especially Mars, Athena, and Hercules, and had the same tendency toward divination by birds and animal entrails. Their cities were surrounded by well-tended farms, while their shepherds would lead their flocks along a pre-determined grazing trail throughout the year.

Warfare was of utmost importance to these Latin tribesmen, and they had a reputation as ferocious fighters. Many believe that the Manipular system adopted by the Roman legions originally belonged to the Samnites, and they certainly understood the importance of army flexibility on the rough terrain of their homeland. They knew their lands well, and often used them to their advantage over the Romans and other peoples with whom they came into conflict.

Bravery served a dual purpose for these rugged shepherds as it directly affected their choice in marriage. Men who had performed great acts of bravery on the battlefield got first choice among the eligible women for a bride. Emotion in the ceremony itself was strictly forbidden, and men were expected to simply choose the woman they wanted with the approval of the tribal elders and priest.

Samnites fought with many weapons similar to Roman arms, including the javelin, spear, and rectangular shield (though theirs were tapered toward the bottom). However, they also excelled at using slings as well as the bow-and-arrow, crafts they no doubt perfected while protecting their herds from wild beasts or neighboring tribes. In one encounter with the Roman army, the Samnites had trapped several legions in a narrow pass called the Caudine Forks and positioned their archers high upon a nearby mountain to keep their enemy hemmed in.

The story goes that Gaius Pontius, the Samnite commander, was at an impasse when that Roman army surrendered to him. He dispatched a letter to his father, Herennius Pontius, a statesman and politician, to pick the old man's brain. Herennius responded in a letter that the Roman army should be freed, for which Rome would be grateful and possibly become an ally. Not liking this idea, Gaius sent another letter to his father, and this time the reply came back that the entire army should be executed, and Rome would then cease to be a threat for at least a generation. Gaius Pontius foolishly decided to try and have his cake and eat it, too, disarming the Romans and forcing them to pass under the “yoke”- a sort of doorway made of their own spears. The army returned unarmed and ashamed, but eager to have revenge and win back their lost honor. After honoring a five-year peace that they agreed to in their terms of surrender, they struck back hard at the Samnites and won the war, executing Gaius Pontius in the process.

Though they showed great promise as an up-and-coming civilization, the Samnites fell prey to their divided, tribal nature, and the Romans were able to play one family against another, successfully subduing their southern neighbors and incorporating them into Roman society as slaves, soldiers, and farmers.

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The Disaster at Cannae

Just as our own Second World War overshadows the First, the Second Punic War made the First look like a ping-pong match. Hannibal Barca, the fearsome Carthaginian leader, had marched through the Alps, allied with several Gallic tribes, and made it his mission in life to humiliate every Roman army that tried to stop him. Thus, Quintus Fabius Maximus was given the title of prodictator, which means acting dictator, and given but one task: stop Hannibal. In hindsight, Fabius appears to be one of the wisest military men in Rome because after closely studying the Roman defeats at Trebia and Trasimene, he knew better than to allow Hannibal to decide the conditions of battle.

Instead of assaulting this army of 56,000 with his much larger force, he shadowed Hannibal during his march through southern Italy, staying up on high defensible ridges and mountains rather than meeting them openly. With enough patience, his strategy probably would have succeeded in either forcing Hannibal to fight on Roman terms, or flee home before his forces dwindled or mutinied. Hannibal tried everything to force a Roman confrontation, pillaging and raiding the countryside and devastating the landscape the Romans had fought so hard in securing a few generations before. However, Fabius was not like the previous hot-blooded Romans that Hannibal had so easily goaded into a fight they couldn't win. His patience meant that the Carthaginian forces had to spend the winter in southern Italy, cut off from their supply and forced to forage in the snow.

The rest of Rome was not sold on Fabius' pragmatism, however, and as soon as his term as prodictator was up, he was denied reelection and two Consuls served in the executive, both of whom favored an aggressive strategy against Hannibal. They were authorized to raise eight instead of the traditional four legions, which comes to 40,000 heavy infantry. In addition, their subservient Latin allies were levied for an additional 40,000 foot soldiers, along with 6,000 Roman and Allied cavalry, so that they outnumbered the Carthaginian troops almost 2 to 1.

Hannibal seized a valuable supply depot in Cannae and the huge Roman army came to face him in open battle. There was some contention among the two Consuls who led the army, with Varro favoring a pitched battle anywhere, anytime, and Paullus favoring a more prudent course of waiting for a better opportunity. On his day of command, Varro ordered his troops into action, changing their formation somewhat to accommodate his sense of tactics. Since they were fighting on an open plain, he had the maniples, who were normally spread out to allow for greater movement and flexibility, pushed together and had the Principes come up close behind the Hastati in an almost-phalanx way.

Hannibal advanced his line to meet the enemy, forming his troops into a “v” formation, pointing their axis toward the Roman line. Varro, believing that this would allow his troops to punch through the line and surround the enemy, advanced his own troops hurriedly, hoping to catch Hannibal off guard. However, as the bold Romans charged, the Carthaginian troops at the very front fell back to the solid line behind them, causing the Romans to charge faster and lose their cohesion, thinking that the enemy was already running away. This gave an opportunity for Hannibal's cavalry to do its work. They charged the opposing Roman cavalry, who were fewer in number and not near as well-equipped, and caused them to rout without much difficulty. Here's a handy diagram to illustrate:

Then they turned their attention to the battle-frenzied infantry line, flanking the Triarii in the rear as they charged forward. Before the Romans had time to react, they were surrounded on all sides, in the center of a deadly crush of arms from both footmen and cavalry. The army was utterly destroyed, according to Polybius around 70,000 died and 10,000 captured with only a few thousand escaping, while Hannibal's forces only suffered around 8-9,000 casualties.

The Senate felt the need to deal with Hannibal quickly because they feared that the other Latin cities would join with Hannibal if he were allowed to roam unchecked for too long. Ironically, it was his victory at Cannae that motivated many former allies of Rome to switch sides and declare for Carthage, including Macedonia, Syracuse, and several Latin cities. After this decisive victory, the Romans saw the need for prudence and pursued a Fabian policy of containment, which was Hannibal's ultimate undoing as he continually tried to replenish his forces for a siege that would never succeed. In the end, it was only by using Hannibal's own tactics against him that the Romans would ever see victory in the Second Punic War.

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Military Monday: The Early Maniples

The Phalanx had served Rome well. The Etruscans used it to dominate the early Romans in the 700's BCE, and the Romans were nothing if not very efficient copy-cats. So they worked toward overcoming Etruscan hegemony and in 509 BCE (or sometime thereabout), they succeeded in overthrowing their king and reforming their constitution to include separation of powers, election of Senators, and citizens' assemblies. Their Hoplite armies proceeded to subdue the cities in northern Italy, and established Roman hegemony in their region. However, the Phalanx proved problematic in several embarrassing battles.

The Roman Phalanx was arrayed with the wealthiest citizens in the front, center rank, which made sense because they had the best quality armor and weapons. A strong core meant a strong army, or so the wisdom of the time dictated. However, an army with weak flanks is just asking for trouble, which the Romans learned at a great cost at The Battle of the Allia around 390 BCE, where the Senone Gauls crushed their flanks and surrounded their core, killing them to the man. Later, in the Second Samnite War (326-304 BCE), the Romans learned from their enemies the value of small, flexible groups in a battle. And by learned from, I mean that they got beaten like little girls several times by these 'barbarians,' before numbers and brute force established their dominance over the hill country of central Italy.

So, whether through sweeping reforms as the later historians claimed, or through the more likely course of gradual tactical evolution, the Romans decided to do away with the single-line Phalanx and make way for a more effective army. This army would consist of three different types of heavy foot soldiers who were arrayed in three lines on the field in a checkerboard formation. Of particular concern, especially to the Roman upper-class, was the economic order of soldiers. Putting the most well-armed and protected soldiers in the front line made sense if you wanted the initial shock to truly penetrate the enemy line, but it meant that those soldiers may be unable to help if the battle was long and contentious. So the change in battle-lines began with placing the poorest of the soldiers (who were still members of that upper rung, just 'lower-upper' classmen) at the front of the army. These front-line soldiers were called Hastati, named for the spears they carried, the Hasta. Early on, all of the soldiers carried these spears, but the Hastati were likely named for it because they were at least wealthy enough to afford their own spear.

All of this would vary because all the equipment was self-provided, but a typical Hastati would be outfitted in leather armor and a bronze helmet, but no leg armor. Along with their Hasta, they would carry a scutum, one of those famous convex rectangular shields. After the Hastati was the Principe, who carried the same weapons, but had leg armor and chain-mail covering their torso, which was highly prized in the ancient world for giving protection without hindering mobility. The third line was composed of Triarii, who had the heaviest armor and highest quality weapons, and fought in a tight phalanx. The flanking units, who were above the Triarii, were the Equites, early cavalrymen rich enough to afford the best armor and weapons, and a horse. Incidentally, this is the reason that horse-related activities are referred to as “equestrian.”

Attached to each of the line soldiers was a compliment of Leves, or javelin-throwers who used light javelins to harass the enemy line before a charge. This proved especially effective against a Phalanx because it is hard to maintain a strong frontal formation while dodging javelins. Gaps could be exploited, and the enemy line could be divided and crushed. Discipline was essential for this kind of fighting, and lieutenants had to pay close attention to the banners and whistles coming from the main army to make sure their unit wasn't surrounded if there was a call to retreat. Training the individual soldiers took a few months out of the year, and it was considered the duty of the wealthy in Rome to protect the city and advance the Roman agenda throughout the world.

A typical Roman battle using the Camillian Maniples would go like this: Hastati charge, while Leves soften the line. If the Hastati couldn't break the enemy battle line, they would retreat in an organized fashion behind the Triarii in the back while the Principes charged forward, making their own attempt to crush the enemy. However, if they could not succeed, then they, too would retreat and the Triarii would charge.

Usually the Triarii could luxuriate behind the battle line and watch the show, but if a battle was going poorly enough for them to get involved, it was not a good sign. A Latin idiom meaning 'to be in a desperate situation' is ' rem ad Triarios redisse,' which literally means, 'it has come to the Triarii.' For example, "How close are you to getting out of debt?” “It has come to the Triarii.” Try it next time someone asks you about a hopeless situation, and the look on their face should lift your spirits nicely!

As well as this primitive strategy worked, it couldn't last forever. And as you may have guessed, it was  humiliating defeat that forced the Romans once again to renew their tactical and strategic methods and ensure their dominance of the Mediterranean. Hannibal, in particular, played a part in bringing the spearmen-based Maniples to an end, especially after a huge Roman army was crushed at the Battle of Cannae.

However, despite the resounding defeats they suffered, what kept Roman culture and influence alive for more than a thousand years was their ability to adapt. It's true that their pride was gravely wounded by massive defeats (especially from the 'barbarians'), but eventually they got over themselves, went back to the drawing board, and found something that worked. And the coming reform of the Legions meant that the class preference in the Roman army would be destroyed for a merit-based seniority system.

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